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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN

DEROGATION OF THE COMMON LAW
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM * and J. RUSSELL LEACH t

The tendency of the lex scripta to supplant the lex von scripta has carried
far since Roscoe Pound published his provocative paper on "Common Law
and Legislation" in 1908.1 One can note at the same time indications that
statute law is being received with much less hostility. The surprising thing,
however, is that legislation in general is not at this day getting a far more
sympathetic reception by lawyers and judges. Clearly they make tip the
professional group which has the largest share in the drafting and enactment
of statutes. In actual practice, moreover, lawyers are given to committing
private as well as public rules of the game to more or less carefully drawn
instruments with a view to implementing broad ideas by detailed provisions
calculated to indicate more clearly the desired line of human conduct. At the
same time, they eschew common law procedures by resorting heavily to private
methods of settlement such as arbitration.
When one considers the huge grab bag of rules of interpretation available
to an American judge he is likely to indulge the very human wish that we could
discard the whole lot and start afresh.2 It would be bootless to dwell upon the
thought. We cannot break abruptly with the past, even if we would. This is
far from saying that we can do little in the way of a calculated effort to adapt
existing institutions and ideas to the needs of a complex and rapidly changing
society. We have no doubt that deliberate attacks can be made. And it is our
purpose in this paper to consider the possibilities of positive action in relation
to a particular canon of interpretation, the "ancient shibboleth," as Mr. justice
Stone called it,3 that a statute in derogation of the common law is to be strictly
construed.
The immediate concern here is not with so-called intrinsic and extrinsic
aids to interpretation. The canon under scrutiny falls in a third category; it
is one of a body of rules which enable the interpreter to indulge certain presumptions. 4 The question is-does the canon gerve any useful function beyond
* Dean of the College of Law, The Ohio State University.
t Reference Librarian, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1. 21 HAxv. L. Rmv. 383 (1908). President Lowell of Harvard has recorded that
Dean Thayer of the Harvard Law School told him he was so impressed by an article by
Roscoe Pound that he wanted to invite him at once to join the Harvard Law Faculty. He
did pursue the thought and brought Pound from the University of Chicago to -larvard
in 1910. We wonder whether the article we have cited was the paper which so stimulated
Thayer. See Lowell, Roscoe Pound, 50 HARv. L. REv. 169 (1936).
2. See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. Rv. 4, 15 (1936).
3. Id. at 18.
4. See Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L. 3. 335, 337,

342 (1949).
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providing a formulation or technique for explaining a decision already otherwise arrived at? 5 Is it a real factor in the process of deciding, in finding meaning in a statute in relation to a particular case? If the answers we should give
were in the negative, one might well put the further query-why concern
yourself beyond this since the rule under examination can do no particular
harm if it does not control decision? It may be suggested here that there might
well be gain in the brevity, clarity and consistency of judicial opinions if the
techniques of rationalization were simplified by thinning out the overgrown
thicket of interpretive aids. It hardly conduces either to the vitality of legal
reasoning or to respect for the legal mind to perpetuate a welter of formal
rules of interpretation from which can always be drawn a set of words calculated
to buttress a desired conclusion.
The inquiry upon which this paper is based has led to the opinion that
we should discard all rules of interpretation in the nature of presumptions.
We would apply this with emphasis to the canon which calls for strict construction of a statute derogating from the common law.
It is to be observed that resort to presumptive rules is not always permissible. When a'court declares that the plain-meaning rule applies with the
effect of precluding interpretation because the statute is clear and unambiguous,
or, put a little differently, admits of but one meaning, it is simply employing
literal interpretation to the exclusion of other aids. While this does have the
effect of preventing recourse to the rule-of-interpretation grab bag, it is open
to serious criticism and we do not choose to stand behind it.6 As Mr. Crawford
has effectively pointed out, the very process of determining that a statutory
provision admits of but one meaning actually involves a choice of meaning. 7
Extreme statements of the plain-meaning rule which are to be found
in earlier writings, serve well to reveal its weakness. Endlich tells us that if
the language has but one meaning effect must be given to it even if the words
go beyond what was probably the intention and the result is absurd or mis-

5. It is a commonplace that "general rules do not decide concrete cases," that judges,
like the rest of us, are likely to decide and then set about talking like a lawyer (or judge)
in explanation or rationalization. The broader the so-called governing rules, whether of
interpretation or otherwise, the more likely this procedure will be. The statement of one
distinguished student 'of legislation that "the so-called rules of construction are not rules
of law but rules of explanation" is questioned here because of its assumption that rules
of law are not rules of explanation. Horack, supra note 4, at 337.
6. We would concur with Mr. Curtis in giving the rule limited effect. "Restrict this
rule to names, singular terms, and words which contain only a definite number of objects,
and the medieval theory which it keeps alive becomes intelligible. These words have meanings as immutable as their objects. They are compendious enumerations. They are taxonomical tags. They are dead words. I should scarcely call them words at all." Curtis, A
Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,supra at 407, 434, also in 4 THE RECORD 321, 353
(Ass'n of Bar of City of New York 1949).
7. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 174 (1940). The point is made with no

less felicity by Professor Horack. Horack, supra note 4, at 338. It is of interest, in contrast, that the latest edition of Maxwell stoutly reasserts the ancient rule. MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

3 (9th ed., Jackson, 1946).
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chiev'ous.S'The courts, fortunately, have not been content to permit the "letter
to kill." Considei the celebrated Trinty Church case, 9 decided four years after
the appearance of Endlich's book. Congress had in 1885 proscribed the encouragement-of importation of aliens to perform "labor or services of any
kind" in the United States by agreement made previous to importation. A
proviso excluded professional artists, lecturers, singers and domestic servants
but made no mention of ministers of the gospel. The chuirch corporation made
a contract with an English clergyman to come over and serve as rector and
pastor of the church. He came and served: The Government sought, unsuccessfully, to recover the penalty prescribed by the act. The Court was not constrained to stand upon a literal interpretation of the words used; it looked
to the language of the title (which referred only to "labor") to the evil or
"mischief" which was intended to be remedied by the act, to the economic and
social context as reflected in the appeal to Congress for legislation and to the
reports of the cognizant Congressional committees and concluded that all
pointed to a legislative intent simply to control the influx of cheap, unskilled
labor from abroad.
The point, in short, is that a court is not compelled by what appears to be
a clear, literal interpretation to forego taking into account the common law or
statutory background, the social matrix, legislative history and the consequences of a literal interpretation viewed in relation to the policy of a measure,
apprehended from consideration of the language of the measure and the other
matters noted here.
HISTORICAL

ORIGINS

Dean Pound would have us believe that the "derogation" canon was
not of English origin but was, in fact, "an American product of the nineteenth
century." 10 In this he is supported by James M. Landis." On the other
hand, C. K. Allen and S. E. Thorne have referred us to English cases of the
sixteenth century and even earlier which embraced a rule of strict construction
of statutes abridging or restraining the common law.12 Perhaps the first
judicial enunciation of the canon in its modern form was that of Chief Justice
Ellsworth in Brown v. Barry,'3 in 1797. There is not much reason to doubt,
however, that Ellsworth's pronouncement was made upon a background of
veneration of the common law which went to the point of zealous guardianship
8.

ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

§ 4 (1888).

9. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L.
Ed. 226 (1892).
10. Pound, supra note 1, at 402.
11. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 235 .ll
(1934).

12.

ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING

379 (4th ed. 1946); Thorne, The Equity of a

Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL. L. REV. 202, 212 (1936).
13. 3 Dall. 365, 1 L. Ed. 638 (U.S. 1797).
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against legislative encroachment. Coke's well-remembered dictum in Bonham's
Case,14 to the -effect that the common law would adjudge void an act of parliament which was against common right and reason, was the extreme expression
of this spirit. While the establishment of pprliamentaiy supremacy in 1688 was
enough to putthe quietus on Coke's declaration, there was yet room for a
measure of common law, 'or, shall we say, -judicial, control of statutes by
refusing to extend their application at the expense of common law principles
or rules to cases not considered to be within their plain language.
One does not find the "derogation" canon articulated in its American
dress by the modern English textwriters. Thus, the latest edition of Maxwell
on Interpretationof Statutes makes no mention of it. We do find expression
of a presumption that the legislature "does not intend to make any substantial
alteration in the law beyond what it expressly declares, either in express terms
or by clear implication, or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and
object of the statute." 15 Is this in substance the same as the American canon?
Endlich declared that it was definitely not so. In his view the English presumption involves a certain strictness of construction but the canon is more restrictive by exacting that a case to be within a statute must fall within both
its letter and spirit. 16 This is a nice distinction, too'nice, in fact, to use with
17
assurance in relation to blunt instruments like rules of strict construction.
The English formulation does appear to consist with the canon, employed both
in England and America, that repeals by implication are not favored. And
Endlich criticized the derogation canon insofar as it carried beyond this; he
would simply apply the construction against changes beyond the immediate
scope and object of a statute to existing common and statute law on an even
footing. Of this more will be said later.
THEORIES ADVANCED IN DEFENSE OF THE CANON

Let us examine the major arguments which have been voiced in support
of the derogation canon. There is the contention that the common law is the
perfection of human reason and is definitely superior to statute law. Both
Sedgwick and Dean Pound long since deflated this idea.' 8 In this day one would
hardly make a serious contention that the common law was ever a fully-matured
14. 8 Co. Rep. 114, 118, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610).
15. MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 85 (9th ed., Jackson, 1946).
16. ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES § 127 (1888).
17. A decision like that in Leach v. Rex, [1912] A.C. 305, would have been as good
an instance as any for parading the "derogation" canon. Section 4 of the Criminal Evidence
Act of 1898 read as follows: "The wife or husband of a person charged with an'offense
under any enactment mentioned in the schedule of this Act may be called as a witness
either for the prosecution or defence and without the consent of the person charged." It
was determined that a wife was not compellable under the act to give evidence against her
husband in a criminal case although she might do so voluntarily.
18. SEDGWICK, CONSTRUCrON OF STATUTES 270 (lst ed. 1857)-; Pound, supra note

1, at 404-06.
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system. It has taken equity and legislation to try to make up for its deficiencies. 19 Again, it was a spotty development; in some respects it was splendid,
while in others it was much in need of correction and improvement. The very
conception of the common law as customary law is, as Pound pointed out, highly
imperfect. 20 The custom is more one of judicial decision than of popular action.
This is nicely illustrated by recent decisions of certain lower federal courts,
sitting in cases where jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship,
recognizing that a minor child may have a cause of action for alienation of
affections of a parent upon whom the child is dependent. 21 We are not aware
of any custom which these decisions can be said to articulate. A very intriguing
aspect of the most recently reported federal case in this series is the invoking
of the derogation canon in so interpreting the Michigan "heart-balm" statute
as to render its ban on heart balm suits inapplicable to the common law cause
22
of action of a minor created by the court after the statute was enacted.
A closely-related contention has been the thought that the common law
is, in any event, a better quality of law than statute law, by and large. The common law, it is said, is distilled from experience and embodies broad principles
which have a durable quality whereas statutes have more of a fiat character
and are devised as rules deemed expedient to cope with this or that problem
by positive command of the sovereign. In line with this type of reasoning we
do not normally make any serious suggestion in our jurisprudence of treating
statutes as sources of law from which we can reason by analogy as we do in
the case of common law principles, but treat them as expressions of policy on
the particular matters with which they are directly concerned. Notable excep2:
tions are some old statutes like the statute of frauds and statutes of limitations.
If there were ever any basis for a broad assertion of common law superiority
over statutes, improvements in the legislative process would assuredly make
a generalization broadly favoring the common law unsafe at this time. It
would appear to be much safer to confine any talk of superiority to particular
principles, rules, standards or concepts and, if that is the case, we are not
in a strong position in assuming common law superiority as a basis for a
general rule of interpretation of statutes.
In rejecting Dean Pound's criticism of the canon Professor Allen has
asserted that "in reality it is an essential guiding rule, for without it the con19. When Maine asserted that legal fictions, equity and legislation have been the
three instrumentalities by which law has been brought into harmony with society lie was
referring broadly to any legal system but he obviously considered that his generalization
was well illustrated by the English development. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, c. 2 (2d Am. ed.
1874).
20. Pound, supra note 1, at 404-06.
21. The landmark case is Dailey v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). Intervening
decisions are cited in Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
22. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949). We do not feel put to it to
wrestle with that venerable straw man, the notion that the court was merely declaring
what had been the common law all the while.
23. Stone, supra note 2, at 13.

1950 ] INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN DEROGATION 443
tinuity of legal development would be gravely imperiled; and it becomes the
more necessary when we remember how few statutes are wholly innovations,
and how many (of that comparatively small number which deal with 'lawyer's
law') are extensions or modifications of existing Common Law rules." 24 This
is a type of proposition the truth of which would be very difficult to demonstrate. One wonders why it is that the value of continuity could not be preserved by interpreting a statute in the light of its common law context without,
at the same time, insisting upon some' sort of predisposition against changes in
the common law. A statute may be in pari materia with preexisting common
law principles and rules just as it might occupy that relationship to earlier
statutes. We would not suggest for a moment the rejection of the first rule
of Heydon's Case, namely, that in construing a statute we should take into
account the "common law before the making of the act." 25 Nor does Professor
Allen appear to recognize the possibility that were a statute, as interpreted by
the courts, to do violence to the symmetry of the law, the opportunity would
still remain to repair the damage by a later statute.
This ,brings us to the next contention supporting the canon. It is the
opinion of Mr. Crawford that "After all, there is perhaps as much reason for
subjecting a statute which abrogates the common law to a strict construction,
as it is to indulge in the presumption against the implied repeal of a statute." 26
In many states there are constitutional provisions which lend some support
to this presumption. There is a common provision in state constitutions to the
effect that no law may be revived or amended unless the new act contains the
entire act revived or the section or sections amended. 2" Doubtless its specific
object is to prevent the confusion and uncertainty which are likely to result
where amendments can be made by the mere striking or insertion of words.
Such a provision does, at the same time, involve a positive effort to make the
amending process clear and coherent by having a section set out at length

24. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 379 (4th ed. 1946). The Minnesota court has expressed the thought in much milder form. "On occasion it [the canon] is a convenient and
appropriate instrument in adjusting a new rule of statute so that it will work smoothly
in reciprocal operation with the old machinery of the common law." State ex reL. City
of St Paul v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault St. Marie Ry., 190 Minn. 162, 165, 251 N.W.
275, 277 (1933). The court added the following significant comment: "But the rule is
misused, inexcusably and dangerously so, when it disguises extraconstitutional obstacles
to, or hindrances of, legislative purpose. Such misuse led, years ago, to this indictment
of the 'whole science of interpretation' as practiced by English judges: 'Some of its rules
cannot well be accounted for except on the theory that Parliament generally changes the
law for the worse, and that the business of judges is to keep the mischief of its interference within the narrowest possible bounds.' Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and
Ethics, 85." 251 N.W. at 277. Unlike the American judges, the English judiciary does not
have recourse to written constitutions in exerting control over legislation. This renders
the English employment of restrictive rules of interpretation the more understandable.
25. 3 Co. Rep. 72, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584).
26. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 491 (1940).
27. For references to constitutional provisions see 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1916 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
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as amended, 28 and, even though it does not preclude amendments or repeals
by implication, 29 it hardly could be said to give them any encouragement.
The short of the matter, however, is that we are not put to it to distinguish
between the implied repeal and derogation canons. The reason is that we are
not disposed to stand upon the implied repeal canon; instead, we would discourage employment of all presumptive rules of interpretation,
It can with reason be urged that any rule of interpretation in the nature
of a presumption should have a logical core, that it should either be well
grounded in actual experience or rested upon sufficiently compelling considerations of policy. Perhaps enough has been said concerning the policy
basis. As for the experiential foundation, it is fairly apparent that every statute
is either declaratory of the common law or changes it in the larger sense of
modifying common law rules or occupying an area previously untouched by
the common law. It is safe to add that little contemporary legislation is of a
merely declaratory character. This appears to make the ultimate answer
simple. The defender of the derogation canon would, however, have one more
string to his bow. At this point he might be expected to declare that the
presumption is not against changes in common law but simply frowns on those
not ordained in express language or by clear implication. This narrows the
question to the query whether experience weighs either way in resolving the
doubt in a given case. The onerous burden of demonstration rests upon him
who would assert that experience favors resolving the doubt against change in
the common law. Meanwhile, we remain sceptical.
LI-MITED USE AS AGAINST COMNPLETE REJECTION OF TIE CANON

The discussion thus far has been rather general. Even if the derogation
canon is vulnerable as a rule of general application the question remains
whether it is supportable with respect to any area of the common law domain.
We suggest that the most likely subject for that distinction is so-called natural
or common rights. While we find conventional expression, as a separate canon,
of the rule that statutes in derogation of natural or common right are to be
strictly construed, it is properly to be treated as a component of the derogation
canon. 30 It is quite understandable that the English courts would lay store
by this "sub-canon"; they do not have recourse to written constitutional
limitations on governmental action. 31 The courts certainly should be sensitive
to encroachments upon personal liberty. In the United States, however, we
28. Effective carry-through on this policy entails adoption of a system under which
the published session laws show both matter eliminated and that inserted or added. This
can be done by resort to brackets and italics.
29. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573 (1863) ; 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1920 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
30. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6206 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
31. Pound, supra note 1, at 387.
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depend upon our bills and declarations of rights to safeguard individual liberty.
It is a commonplace, moreover, that our courts generally favor interpretation
consistent with constitutionality.3 2 The answer here, in sum, is that there is
no demonstrated need, in our system, for extraconstitutional judicial restraints
on governmental action in the interest of individual freedom.
VAGARIES OF THE

RULE

One serious objection to the presumptive rules rests upon the facility
with which they may be drawn upon to support either side of a case hinging
upon statutory interpretation.- One hardly need point to the common situation
where a statute may be said to be at once remedial and in derogation of the
common law. Again, a statute may be penal in part and remedial in part.
The canons, of course, bespeak liberal interpretation for remedial statutes and
strict interpretation for penal acts. In the second type of situation the remedial
provisions may be liberally construed and the penal sections and clauses dealt
with strictly but no such reconciliation may be effected in cases of the first
type. Sometimes the derogation canon triumphs and sometimes the remedial
rule.
A leading Ohio case involving municipal responsibility in tort is illustrative. Ohio has long had a statute which requires municipalities to keep their
streets in repair and free from nuisance.33 This could have been treated as
a governmental mandate, the violation of which would not involve civil consequences, but the courts have interpreted it to impose civil duties to people
using the streets. It was decided in City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 34 however,
that this did not apply to a situation where one was injured by a municipal
truck hauling materials for street repairs. A person who fell into a hole in a
street and then was bowled over by a street repair truck as he crawled back
onto the pavement might recover for injuries due to the fall but not for the
bones broken by the truck. The court recited the derogation canon as compelling strict construction of the statute but made no mention of its remedial
character. This mechanical employment of the derogation canon occurred in
a state in which the early cases supported a broad rule of municipal liability
in tort 35 and in which the judicially-evolved theory of immunity from tort
liability with respect to governmental functions had recently been shaken by
a short-lived judicial repudiation of the whole immunity theory. 36 And this is
32. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 65 Sup. Ct. 1384,
89 L. Ed. 1725 (1944) ; United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 9 L. Ed. 1004 (U.S. 1838).

33. Oio GEN. CODE § 3714 (1948).
34. 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927).
35. Hunter and Boyer, Tort Liability of Local Government in Ohio, 9 OHio ST. L.J.
377, 379 (1948).
36. See Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919) ; and Aldrich v.
Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
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the case which gave the Utah court much comfort in reaching a like result
notwithstanding an interpretation statute reversing the derogation canon! 37
On occasion the derogation canon has even been invoked against a
person whose common law rights have been narrowed by statute. In Klein v.
United Theatres Co.,38 a modern corporation statute had taken away the
common law right of a single dissenting shareholder to prevent a sale of the
corporate assets and given him, instead, a right, on timely objection "in
writing," to receive the fair cash value of his shares. The question was whether
a written objection signed and filed by an authorized attorney who did not
furnish any evidence of his authority was effective. The ruling was in the
negative. While we are not suggesting that the derogation canon was controlling, it was, in fact, recited and the statute declared to be in derogation of
the common law without recognition of the fact that the effect of a restrictive
construction would be to derogate further from the common law as to stockholders' rights.
THE GENERAL AND UNCRITICAL JUDICIAL
ACCEPTANCE AND USE OF THE CANON

If one is to judge by its reiteration, at least, there seems to be little doubt
but that the derogation canon has gained a solid footing in American law.
The rule has been invoked in the construction of innumerable federal and
state statutes without evident discrimination as to subject matter. It has been
employed in interpreting statutes on copyright, domestic relations, liens,
municipal tort liability, duties of property owners respecting sidewalks, summary jurisdiction of courts, evidence, insurance, negotiable instruments, labor,
agency, corporations, pleading, procedure, descent and distribution, trusts,
insolvency proceedings, damages, administrative law and zoning, as well as
legislative grants of authority to local governments, and even interpretation
acts. 39 The emphasis upon "common law" does not appear to have excluded
application of the rule to equitable principles. 40
If, as we are told in the Erie case,41 there is no common law of the United
States, what basis could there be for applying the derogation canon in interpreting federal statutes? It is evident enough that common law ideas lie in the
background of this or that provision of federal law and that it is appropriate to
look to the past in interpreting such provisions, but this is hardly the same
thing as taking a strict view of statutes of a political unit which derogate from
37. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941).
38. 148 Ohio St 306, 74 N.E.2d 319 (1947).
39. For collections of cases see 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6202
(3d ed., Horack, 1943); annotations to N.Y. CONS. LAW § 301 (McKinney, 1942 and
Supp. 1949).
40. It re Washburn, 32 Minn. 336, 20 N.W. 324 (1884); Blackman v. Wheaton, 13
Minn. 299 (1868).
41. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
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its own unwritten law. We have not encountered any federal case in which this
thought was developed. On the other hand, there are cases in which the derogation canon has been invoked with respect to federal legislation without question.42 Several recent cases have, with respect to commercial transactions to
which the Federal Government is a party, opened a field of what might be called
federal "general law." 43 In that area the rule is, doubtless, as applicable to
federal legislation as it is to state statutes generally.
The application of the derogation canon has not been confined to "lawyers
law," that is, private law governing ordinary personal and business relations
and civil procedure as well. The growing body of public regulatory law has
not eluded the reach of the canon. While we applaud in principle the significant
observation by Harlan F. Stone that the derogation canon has little scope in
the interpretation of statutes establishing administrative agencies and defining
their powers, 44 we must record that our examination of the cases does not
disclose judicial support for the thesis. The cases do not concede the inappropriateness or vulnerability of the canon even in relation to this type of
statute.
While the derogation canon has been freely criticized by text and periodical
writers, there has been scant suggestion of judicial dissatisfaction with it.
Many courts, on particular occasions, have found the rule inapplicable or
overcome, but seldom has a court attacked it as ill-conceived or undesirable.
Notable exceptions to this statement do exist, however. Nearly a hundred
years ago, Judge Platt Potter of New York, who later produced an American
edition of Dwarris on Statutes, strongly decried strict construction. 45 Critics
of the canon have drawn comfort from the opinion in a 1933 Minnesota case
in which it was declared: "We do not consider ourselves at liberty to apply
any rule of 'strict construction' to this or any other statute simply because it
happens to be in derogation of the common law." 46 Positive as this rejection
appeared, it was destined to be short-lived. Seven years later the same court
applied the old rule, after quoting the opinion in the previous case and saying,
"Nevertheless, we should also be mindful that 'Long-established and valuable
remedies are abrogated by statute only by "specific enactment or necessary
implication."' 1..
47 As long ago as 1888, the Court of Appeals of New York
was prepared to assert that the canon was so firmly established that it would
take legislation to break its hold. The court's language bears quoting. "How42. Cases applying the canon to federal statutes since the Erie case include: Grimes
Packing Co. v. Hynes, 67 F. Supp. 43 (D.C. Alaska 1946), rev'd, 337 U.S. 86 (1949);
United States v. Hark, 49 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1943), rev'd, 320 U.S. 531 (1944);
West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. McElligott, 40 F. Supp. 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
43. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 68 Sup. Ct. 123, 92 L. Ed. 32
('1947) ; Gorrell and Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 276 (1948).
44. Stone, supra note 2,at 18.
45. Billings v. Baker, 28 Barb. 343 (N.Y. 1859), affirming 15 How. Pr. 525 (1858).
46. Teders v. Rothermel, 205 Minn. 470, 286 N.W. 353, 354 (1939).
47. Bloom v. American Express Co., 222 Minn. 249, 23 N.W.2d 570, 573 (1946).
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ever much modern judges might sometimes be inclined to doubt the beneficial
results to be derived from an always strict adherence to the rule, grounded'
upon some possible doubts of th6 highest order of excellence in all cases of the
common law, or of its being without exception the perfection of human reasoning in any other than a very narrow, technical and one-sided way, yet the
rule itself is too securely and firmly established and grounded in our jurisprudence to be altered other than by legislative interference." 48 In other words,
only the legislatures could do away with a court-made rule fashioned as a
tool for use in the judicial function of interpretation.
Is interpretation legislation the answer? What reception might one
expect the courts to accord it?
INTERPRETATION

STATUTES

"The experience of history... shows that the judicial function of interpretation is inevitable and will in the long run always assert itself." 49 Nowhere
has this proposition greater vitality than in the United States. Nevertheless,
the legislatures may resort to several devices designed to provide some guidance
in determining the meaning of statutes. One of these is interpretation acts.
It hardly need be stated that interpretive measures are, themselves, subject to
interpretation. Equally obvious is the fact that while a fiction may be used to
say that a later act was adopted with reference to an interpretive statute, subsequent legislatures are not bound to submit to that statute.
Any serious suggestion at this day that since interpretation is a judicial
function a general interpretive act, applicable only to future statutes, would be
unconstitutional, could hardly be taken seriously. 50 In both England -*1 and
America we have long proceeded on the basis that, although ultimate interpretation is for the courts, it is within the legislative province to lay down rules
of interpretation for the future. 52 The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws has even undertaken the preparation of a Uniform
Statutory Construction Act.53
While we do not perceive that general interpretive acts should be denied
prospective application to existing statutes, there is adverse authority.5"
Actually, if the legislation does not dress a change in meaning in the form of
48. Fitzgerald v. Quann, 109 N.Y. 441, 445, 17 N.E. 354 (1888).
49. Freund, Interpretationof Statutes, 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 207, 209 (1917).
50. While no cases have been found which expressly deny this statement, the opinions
in two Pennsylvania cases which involved retrospective interpretive acts contain language
broad enough to condemn all interpretive acts as violative of separation of powers. Commonwealth ex reL. Roney v. Warwick, 172 Pa. 140, 33 At. 373 (1895) ; Titusville IronWorks v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, 15 Atl. 917 (1888). Examples of courts applying
interpretive statutes to later acts are too numerous to mention.
51. Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 ViC. c. 63.
52. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3003 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
53. NAT. CONF. OF CoMI'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1944 HANDBOOK 240.

54. Note, 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 189, 196 (1938).
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zan interpretive provision but merely provides an aid in determining meaning
there should be no more objection than in the case of its application to a future
statute.
If it is thought to effect a change in meaning, is not the true question
whether the process of amendment was regular? 55 If an interpretation act
-could not be made to apply to the future operation of existing statutes its usefulness would obviously be very'greatly limited. At the same time, one must
-consider the impact upon the judicial-mind of a general interpretation clause
designed to cover a great body of existing law. In 1947, the Ohio General
Assembly inserted a separability clause in its more than 13,000-section General
Code.5 6 The clause purports to make each section and part of a section
separable. This is so unrealistic in terms of the actual situation as to interdependence of existing code sections that it is likely to carry little authority
or weight.
A truly retrospective interpretation act involves some additional considerations. If it purports to control interpretation in a pending case or to.give
effect to an interpretation different from that employed in a case already
decided and does that with respect to the very matter then in litigation it would
surely meet with judicial disfavor as an effort to interfere with the independence
or finality of judicial decision. 57 Even in the absence of that factor, an interpretive act would not, generally speaking, be given effect by the courts as to
past transactions. 58

Forty-one states and three territories have statutes abrogating the rule
of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law in regard
to all or part of their legislation. The form and extent of these interpretive
statutes vary. Two states, for example, have statutes providing that certain
acts shall not be limited by any rules of strict construction but rather that
they shall be liberally construed. 59 All of the other statutes hereafter. mentioned
state the common law rule of construction and expressly provide that it shall
not be applicable to designated codes or acts. Many of these statutes further

55. Thus, in Titusville Iron-Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627, 15 AtI. 917
(1888), the statute was held violative of the constitutional provision that no law should
be amended by reference to its title only. It should be noted that in this case the statute,
in substance, attempted to amend a particular statute but in so doing used words of construction. It should further be noted that such constitutional provisions as this do not
prohibit amendments or repeals by implication. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573
(1863) ; 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRucrIoN § 1922 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
56. OHIo GEN. CODE § 26-2 (1948).
57. People ex reL Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Board of Supervisors, 16
N.Y. 424 (1857).
58. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRTION § 6205 n.6 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
There is no evident reason why this must needs be so as to legislation which is in substance and effect curative and where the transaction validated is something the legislature
could at the time still authorize. That, however, is a matter beyond our purview.
59. IN . STAT. ANN. § 2-4703 (Bums, 1933); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 144

(1932).
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provide that the acts should be "liberally construed with a view to effect their
objects and to promote justice." 60
The abrogating provision has been used with reference to single acts,
certain subdivisions of the state statutes or even to the entire statute law of
the state. Examples of its application to single acts are found in the Uniform
Partnership Act 61 and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.0 2 It has likewise been applied to an article on workmen's compensation 63 and a chapter
dealing with the relationship of husband and wife. 64 Such a provision has
been widely employed in civil practice acts. 65 Ohio has a clause of this character
applicable to Part III of its General Code. 66 While Part III is entitled "Remedial," it appears to be largely procedural. In other states we find the device
70
6
applied to civil codes, 67 all civil statutes, a political code 69 and a probate act.
Twelve states have substantially abrogated the old canon with respect to all
of their legislation. 71 Of these Pennsylvania alone has ordained expressly that
the old canon should remain in force as to statutes enacted prior to the interpre72
tation act.
The effectiveness of the statutes is very difficult to determine. Presumably,
if followed in good spirit they would bring about wider applications of primary
statutes but this can hardly be demonstrated in fact. One cannot be sure that,
absent the interpretive provision, the result would have been different in a
particular case. We can say that they, by and large, have served to take away
73
one formulation otherwise available to explain a restrictive interpretation.
60. See, e.g., IDAHO LAWS ANN. § 73-102 (1949).
61. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 4(1). See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 4; OIo
GEq. CODE ANN. § 8105-4 (Supp. 1949) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 7843 (Williams, 1934). Only
Utah of the 29 states which have enacted the Uniform Partnership Act has omitted this
sectiop.
62. UNIFORm LImiTED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 28(1). See, e.g., N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW
§ 117; TENN. CODE ANN. § 7909 (Williams, 1934). Iowa, Missouri and Utah of the 29
states enacting the Act have omitted this section.
63. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws, art. 101, § 78 (1939).
64. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6898 (1932). This provision was aimed at chapter
183 of the Washington Code of 1881. The provisions of that chapter are now embodied
in Title 42 of the Revised Statutes.
65. See, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-131 (1947); CAL. CODE CIr. PROc. ANN. § 4 (1949);
ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 110, § 128 (1948) ; Ky. CODE CIv. PRAc. § 733 (1948) ; NED. REV. STAT.
§ 25-2218 (1943) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:27-2 (1939) ; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. Acr § 3; S.C. CODE
ANN. § 902 (1942); Wyo. CoIIP. STAT. ANN. § 3-102 (1945).
66. OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 10214 (1948).
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (1949) ; CANAL ZONE CODE, tit. 3, § 4 (1934).
68. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 10(8) (1947).
69. CAL. POLIT. CODE § 4 (1944).
70. ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 3, § 159 (1941).
71. IDAHO LAWS ANN. § 73-102 (1949); IoWA CODE § 4.2 (1946) ; KAN. GEN. STAT.
AN\N. § 77-109 (1935) ; Ky. REV. STAT. A.N. § 446.080 (1943); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §
645 (1939) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 12-202 (1947) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 1-0201 (1943);
OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 2, tit. 25, § 29 (1941) ; and PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 46, § 538 (1941) ;
S.D. CODE § 65.0202(1) (1939) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 88-2-2 (1943). It is of interest that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania borrowed from the statutory construction act to
declare that the derogation canon shall not be applicable to the rules of the court. Rule
130 of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules of Procedure, 332 Pa. lxix (1939).
72. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 46, § 558(8) (1941).
73. In re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 474, 159 P.2d 643, 644 (1945); Baugh v.
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The statutes have not universally achieved even this much. There have been
cases where they were ignored and the old canon applied. 74 As has already been
noted, moreover, interpretive statutes have generally been restricted in application to later legislation. 7 5 The effectiveness of these interpretive provisions
has been limited in other ways.
Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 211, 148 P.2d 633, 639 (1944); Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1,
56, 16 Pac. 345, 370 (1888) ; Bayless v. Mull, 50 Cal. App. 2d 66, 74, 122 P.2d 608, 609
(1942) ; In re Paterson's Estate, 34 Cal. App. 2d 305, 93 P.2d 825 (1939) ; In re Grant's
Estate, 34-P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. App. 1934) ; In re Crutcher, 61 Cal. App. 481, 215 Pac.
101 (1923) ; Glidden v. Whittier, 46 Fed. 437, 439 (C.C.D. Idaho 1891) (Idaho statute) ;
Abernethy v. Peterson, 38 Idaho 731, 225 Pac. 132 (1924) ; State v. Altwatter, 29 Idaho
107, 110, 157 Pac. 256, 257 (1916) ; Flood v. McClure, 3 Idaho 587, 592, 32 Pac. 254, 255
(1893); Darby v. Heagerty, 2 Idaho 282, 13 Pac. 85 (1887); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 283 II1. App. 527, 532 (1936) ; Blakely v. Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 20
N.W,2d 28 (1945); Adoption of Alley, 234 Iowa 931, 14 N.W.2d 742 (1944); Jermaine
v. Graf, 225 Iowa 1063, 1066, 283 N.W. 428, 430 (1939) ; Sullivan v. Harris, 224 Iowa
345, 357, 276 N.W. 88, 92 (1937) ; It re Van Vechten's Estate, 218 Iowa 229, 251 N.W.
729 (1933) ; The Peterson Co. v. Freeburn, 204 Iowa 646, 215 N.W. 746 (1927) ; Chiesa
& Co. v. Des Moines, 158 Iowa 346, 138 N.W. 922 (1912) ; Sires v. Melvin, 135 Iowa 460,
470, 113 N.W. 106, 107 (1907) ; Hopkins v. Antrobus, 120 Iowa 24, 94 N.W. 251 (1903) ;
Van Horn v. Van Horn, 107 Iowa 247, 77 N.W. 846 (1899) ; Harris v. Brown, 187 .Fed.
6, 10 (8th Cir. 1911) (Kansas statute) ; Produce Exchange Bank v. School District No.
86, 138 Kan. 834, 28 P.2d 742 (1934); Hill v. Halmhuber, 225 Ky. 394, 9 S.W.2d 55
(1928); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 180, 183, 169 S.W. 587, 589 (1914); Myer
v. Gaertner, 106 Ky. 481, 50 S.W. 971 (1899) ; Sutton v. Sutton, 87 Ky. 216, 8 S.W. 337
(1888) ; Dillehay v. Hickey, 71 S.W. 1 (Ky. 1902) ; Cooper v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., 356 Mo. 482, 488, 202 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1947) ; It re Duren, 355 Mo. 1222, 1235, 200
S.W. 2d 343, 344 (1947) ; Women's Christian Ass'n v. Brown, 354 Mo. 700, 707, 190 S.'XV.2d
900, 901 (1945) ; Betz v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 253 S.W. 1089 (Mo. App. 1923);
Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Broutin, 133 F.2d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 1943) (Ohio statute);
Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 56, 68 N.E.2d 75, 79 (1946); Smith v. Buck, 119
Ohio St. 101, 109, 162 N.E. 382, 384 (1928) ; In re Estate of McCombs, 52 Ohio L. Abs.
353, 366 (1948) ; Frame v. Shaffer, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 617, 619, 27 Ohio Op. 346, 347 (1943) ;
Brenneman v. Brenneman, 1 Ohio N.P. 332, 3 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 392 (1895) ; Englebrecht
v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 542 (Okla. 1949) ; Emery v. Goff, 198 Okla. 534, 542, 180 P.2d 175,
184 (1947) ; It re Captain's Estate, 191 Okla. 463, 464, 130 P.2d 1002 (1942) ; EX parte
Reniff, 65 Okla. Cr. 400, 88 P.2d 382 (1939) ; Bonsall Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 251 (1948) ;
Smith v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 50 Pa. D. & C. 581 (1944) ; Casey v. Edwards,
46 Pa. D. & C. 520 (1942) ; Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320,
137 S.W. 1120 (1911) ; Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) ;
Moore v. Keesey, 26 Wash. 2d 31, 173 P.2d 130 (1946) ; State ex rel. Rothwell & Co.,
Inc., v. Superior Court for King County, 111 Wash. 71, 189 Pac. 556 (1920) ; Allen v.
Houn, 30 Wyo. 186, 219 Pac. 573 (1923).
74. Armas v. Oakland, 135 Cal. App. 411, 27 P.2d 666 (1933); Bostic v. Workman,
224 Mo. App. 645, 31 S.W.2d 218 (1930); Crowley v. Polleys Lumber Co., 92 Mont.
27, 9 P.2d 1068 (1932) ; City of Waco v. Roberts, 121 Tex. 217, 48 S.W.2d 577 (1932) ;
Lone Star Finance Co. v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co., 28 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930) ; Silurian Oil Co. v. White, 252 S.W. 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Scott, 218 S.W. 53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Moormeister v. Golding, 84 Utah
324, 27 P.2d 447 (1933). Of interest in this regard is Chiesa & Co. v. Des Moines, 158
Iowa 343, 346,.138 N.W. 922, 923 (1912), wherein the court stated, "The old rule has
at times been quoted by our courts with apparent forgetfulness of this wholesome provision,
and a statute so clearly in accord with essential justice and fairness ought not be ignored
or allowed to fall into disuse."
75. Taff v. Tallman, 277 Mo. 157, 209 S.W. 868 (1919) ; Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Bergman, 128 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). A series of Pennsylvania
cases is to the same effect, but relies upon the exemption for prior statutes written into
the statutory construction act. 46 PA. STAT. ANN. § 558(8) (1941) ; Beck v. Beiter, 146
Pa. Super. 114, 22 A.2d 90 (1941) ; Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 229, 8 A.2d
611 (1939) ; Dlugas v. United Air Lines, 53 Pa. D. & C. 402 (1944) ; Welch Grape Juice
Co. v. Frankford Grocery Co., 36 Pa. D. & C. 653, 660 (1939). See also, In re Jessup's
Estate, 22 Pac. 742 on rehearing of 81 Cal. 408, 21 Pac. 976 (1889), where the court
says that such an interpretive statute is inapplicable in construing a statute with regard
to an act done prior to the enactment of the interpretive statute.
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The Supreme Court of Montana has concluded that the construction
statute does not overcome the proposition that the rules of the common law
are not to be overturned except by clear and unambiguous lang age. 7 13y a
strict construction of a liberal interpretation statute the court was able to declare, in effect, that once a statute has been found to be in derogation of the
common law, it will be liberally construed, but the legislative intent to derogate
must first appear from clear and unambiguous language. We suggest that the
court was making a false distinction; the determination whether there is a
change in the common law is the very stuff of the matter.
Another method of avoiding the statute is to give it lip service and then
proceed to use the old rule anyway. It would not be fair to say that there had
been many instances of this approach. In an Iowa case a broad statutory rule
of liberal interpretation did not deter the court from holding that a statute
which enabled a married woman to prosecute in her own name actions in tort
or for the enforcement of any legal or equitable right did not permit her to
sue her husband. Nor did the statute deter the court from asserting: "Tile
relations of husband and wife to each other are essentially different from
those of all other persons, and statutes dealing therewith should be clear and
explicit in meaning, particularly when abrogation of a rule of the common
law is involved." 7
A third, and closely allied, method of restricting the application of the
primary statute is to give a strict construction in determining the persons or
classes of persons entitled to its benefits and a liberal construction in applying
the statutes in their favor. 78 This looks like a hybrid combination of the old
restrictive canon and the equally familiar rule that statutes which are procedural or remedial, in the strict sense, should be liberally construed.
In his edition of Sutherland's treatise on Statutory Interpretation Professor Horack says, "These general interpretive provisions have generally effectuated their purpose ." .. 17 This we are constrained to doubt. The demonstration that they carried decisive weight in any of the cases he cited would
be no mean performance.
It is our belief that criticisms of the derogation canon and the enactment
of legislation to discard or modify it have been directed more at the attitude
of hostility to legislation reflected in the canon than its weakness as a tool of
interpretation. Many of the pertinent statutes call for liberal construction to
effect the objects of the laws construed and to promote justice. It is not a
serious reflection upon the bar and the judges to say that a statutory exhorta76. Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932).

77. In re Dolmage's Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553, 555 (1927). See also
Schwartz v. Inspiration Gold Mining Co., 15 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Mont. 1936) (Mont.
statute); Hill v. Halmhuber, 225 Ky. 394, 9 S.W.2d 55 (1928).
78. Whittlesey v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 653, 163 Pac. 193 (1917). See also Estate of De
Laveaga, 4 Coffey's Prob. Dec. 423, 429 (Cal. 1899).
79. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6205 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
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tion in favor of liberal construction is not calculated to extirpate deep-seated
attitudes. The most hopeful possibilities here lie, we believe, in the realm of
legal education and of this more will be said later.
As for techniques of interpretation, we reiterate that should a court wish
to construe a statute strictly, it would find an abundance of tools remaining to
replace the one withdrawn. We have already referred to three methods of
avoiding the interpretive statute. In addition various "sets of words (more
or less) well-played" are at hand. It may simply be said that the court cannot
extend the meaning of a section further than the "clear intendment" of the
statute, 80 or that the words of a section may not be extended beyond their
"plain import." 81 Again we may be told that a liberal construction does not
permit "supplying words omitted," 82 or that the right must be found in the
statute itself "fairly construed." 83 Oft-repeated is the observation that it is
the duty of a court to administer the law as it is written, and not to make the
law.8 4 Nor does the interpretive statute abrogate the rule that "one claiming
to be within the protection of the act must so show." 85 Liberal construction
may not, it is said, extend a statute so as to require the performance of duties
impossible of performance.8 6
As we have already seen, 'some of the interpretive statutes attempt to
reverse the situation by substituting liberal for restrictive interpretation. In
other words, they adopt a new presumptive rule with a different emphasis.
As a general canon applicable to a great variety of statutes it is vulnerable to
two of the major objections to the derogation canon: (1) it assumes too much
when applied generally without discrimination and (2) it is, at best, little
more than a formulation for use by way of apology instead of a guide to decision. Why, as a general proposition, put a statute at the plate with one strike
already called, or, conversely, allow four strikes instead of three?
CONCLUSION

The law schools must accept a large share of the responsibility for the
inadequate development of sympathetic insight into the legislative process by
lawyer and judge. By and large, the emphasis in law teaching upon judicial
methods and processes has been so great that the law student almost inevitably
has become pre-occupied with case law and adjudication. The student editor
of a law review who insisted that he could not prepare a worthwhile comment
80. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800, 804 (1941).

81. Young v. Kipe, 38 Pa. D. & C. 434, 437 (1940).
82. The Peterson Co. v. Freeburn, 204 Iowa 644, 646, 215 N.W. 746, 748 (1927).

83. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 137 S.W. 1120, 1123

(1911).

84. Ibid.
85. Stringer v. Calmes, 167 Kan. 278, 205 P.2d 921, 925 (1949).
86. Gorges v. State Highway Commission, 137 Kan. 340, 343, 20 P.2d 486, 487 (1933).
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relating to a problem of state constitutional law for want of case authorities
was pointedly footnoting this unbalance in perspective.
The legislative process is no whit less important in our legal system than
is the adjudicative. It is high time, therefore, that the law schools undertake
seriously to deal with legislative method and procedure as well as interpretation. There is strong reason, moreover, to launch the program in the first year
of law study. Else, the unbalance in student perspective, which we have mentioned, may have become set before the student is really introduced to legislation.
Fortunately, there are able, articulate and vigorous law teachers who
are both practicing and spreading this "gospel." 87 Legislation is gaining greater recognition in law school curricula. We make bold to cite an innovation in
the curriculum of the College of Law of The Ohio State University. In the
revised curriculum of the College a required course on Legislation runs
throughout the first year. It covers legislative method, legislative organization
and procedure and statutory interpretation.
When it comes to putting forward positive suggestions for improving
the techniques of statutory interpretation we gladly defer to others who are
participating in this symposium. Only one or two observations will be ventured here.
There is room for great improvement in legislative drafting. Once again
it is well to emphasize that a constructive initial attack can be made at the
law school level. An adequate program of instruction in a modern law school
stresses skills training as well as transmission of information and development
of insights. In the field of legislation a student can be given insights into the
formulation of legislative policy as well as training in the articulation of policy
in statutes.

At the state level we have lagged far behind Congress in both projecting
and implementing the legislative function as a vital continuing process of
government. It is still the dominant state theory that a legislature is a parttime branch of government which can do its job by meeting two or three
months every other year. It is true that this is offset in part by the development
of legislative councils and other fact-finding agencies, legislative reference
services and drafting agencies. Most state legislatures have a long way to go,
however, before they could be said to be doing a thorough job of investigation,
deliberation and drafting. There is such a thing, moreover, as "simpler statutewriting." 88 A more determined effort can be made to spell out in the language of a measure the larger considerations of policy behind it. Old-fashioned

87. Jones, A Case Study in Neglected Opportnity: Law Schools and the Legislative
Development of the Law, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1949).
88. Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458 (1947).
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preambles are deadly but policy statements can be made at whatever length
may be appropriate in forceful prose style in the purview of an act.
While there has been not a little-criticism of late directed to the use of
extrinsic aids, particularly legislative history, in statutory interpretation, we
are not persuaded that the practice should be discouraged. 89 Abuses in the
form of manufactured legislative history would be disturbing if beyond control. But are they? Where the facts as to the ersatz character of legislative history can be ferreted out by opposing counsel that material can, of course, be
discredited. We favor enlargement of the sources of legislative interpretation
at the same time that we would eliminate formal rules in the nature of presumptions. Instead of indulging assumptions we would weigh all relevant
data.
A concomitant of a thorough legislative process at the state level would
be the development of committee reports, hearings and other documents which
constitute "legislative history." It, thus, would enrich the sources of interpretation of state statutes.
Finally, administrative experience with legislation offers its lessons. Administrative agencies are engaged in drafting and promulgating both interpretive regulations and true subordinate legislation. Often an agency will
have had a hand in the drafting of the governing statute. Here we have a
tremendous amount of practice in law-making and interpretation which should
tell us some "do's" as well as "don'ts."
89. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535 (1948) ; Curtis. A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, supra at
407.

